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Banks and financial intermediaries that originate loans often sell some of these loans or securitize
them in secondary loan markets and hold on to others. New issuances in such secondary markets collapse
abruptly on occasion, typically when collateral values used to secure the underlying loans fall. These
collapses are viewed by policymakers as signs that the market is not functioning efficiently. In this
paper, we develop a dynamic adverse selection model in which small reductions in collateral values
can generate abrupt inefficient collapses in new issuances in the secondary loan market. In our model,
reductions in collateral values worsen the adverse selection problem and induce some potential sellers
to hold on to their loans. Reputational incentives induce a large fraction of potential sellers to hold
on to their loans rather than sell them in the secondary market. We find that a variety of policies that
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Following the sharp decline in the volume of new issuances in the U.S. secondary loan market in
the fall of 2007, policymakers argued that the market was not functioning normally and proposed
and carried out a variety of policy interventions intended to restore the normal functioning of
this market. Here we construct a model in which new issuances in the secondary loan market
abruptly collapse and this collapse is associated with an increase in ineﬃciency. We also argue that
reductions in the value of the collateral used to secure the underlying loans are particularly likely to
trigger sudden collapses associated with increased ineﬃciency. Since sudden collapses are associated
with increased ineﬃciency, our model is consistent with policymakers’ views that the market was
functioning poorly. We use this model to analyze proposed and actual policy interventions and
argue that these interventions typically do not remedy the ineﬃciency associated with the market
collapse.
In our model, the main economic function of the secondary loan market is to allocate originated
loans to institutions that have a comparative advantage in holding and managing the loans. This
economic function is disrupted by informational frictions. In our model, loan originators diﬀer in
their ability to originate high quality loans. The originators are better informed about their ability
to generate high quality loans than are potential purchasers. This informational friction creates an
adverse selection problem. The focus of our analysis is to examine the extent to which reputational
considerations ameliorate or intensify the adverse selection problem in these markets. In order to
analyze these reputational considerations, we develop a dynamic adverse selection model of the
secondary loan market.
Our main ﬁnding is that our model has fragile outcomes in which sudden collapses in the volume
of new issuances in secondary loan markets are associated with increased ineﬃciency. We say that
outcomes are fragile if the model has multiple equilibria or if a large number of originators change
their decisions in response to small changes in aggregate fundamentals.
In terms of fragility as multiplicity, we show that our baseline dynamic adverse selection model
with reputation has multiple equilibria for a range of reputation levels. In one of these equilibria,
labeled the positive reputational equilibrium, high quality loan originators have incentives to sell at
a current loss in order to improve their reputations and command higher prices for future loans.
2In the other equilibrium, labeled the negative reputational equilibrium, loan originators who sell
their loans are perceived by future buyers to have low quality loans. These perceptions induce high
quality loan originators to hold on to their loans. Since low quality originators always sell their
loans, the volume of new issuances is larger in the positive reputational equilibrium than in the
negative reputational equilibrium.
To see that the multiplicity of equilibria implies that our model can generate sudden collapses
in the volume of new issuances, consider some exogenous event that induces originators and buyers
to switch from the positive to the negative reputational equilibrium. If many originators have
reputation levels in the multiplicity region, this event induces a sudden collapse in the volume of
new issuances. We provide conditions under which the positive reputational equilibrium yields
higher welfare than the negative reputational equilibrium (both in the interim and ex-ante sense
of eﬃciency as in Holmstrom and Myerson (1983).) Therefore, our model can generate sudden
collapses associated with increased ineﬃciency.
While the multiplicity of equilibria has the attractive feature that it implies that the model can
be consistent with observations of sudden collapses, such multiplicity makes it diﬃcult to conduct
policy analysis. We propose a reﬁnement adapted from the coordination games literature (see
Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (2003)). Our reﬁnement is also motivated
by the idea that sudden collapses in the volume of new issuances in loan markets are associated
with falls in the value of the collateral that supports the underlying loans. These considerations
lead us to add ﬂuctuations in the collateral value and to assume that the collateral value is observed
with an arbitrarily small error.
We show that ﬂuctuations in the collateral value make the outcomes of our model consistent
with our second notion of fragility, namely, a large fraction of loan originators choose to change
their decisions on whether to sell or hold their loans in response to small changes in collateral
values. In this sense, reductions in collateral values can induce sudden collapses in the volume of
new issuances for the market as a whole.
Both adverse selection and the dynamics induced by reputation acquisition play central roles in
generating sudden collapses from small changes in collateral values. A simple way of seeing the role
of adverse selection is to note that the version of our model with symmetrically informed originators
and buyers does not produce sudden collapses in new issuances. With asymmetrically informed
3agents, originators with high reputations receive higher prices for their loans and are therefore more
willing to sell their loans. We show that a fall in collateral values makes high quality originators less
willing to sell their loans. This result follows because the market price, being a weighted average
of the loans sold by low and high quality originators, falls by a larger amount than does the return
to a high quality originator to holding a loan. A fall in collateral values tends to induce originators
who were close to being indiﬀerent about selling versus holding to hold. Small changes in collateral
values can induce a large number of originators to switch to holding from selling only if they are
all close to the point of indiﬀerence. In a static model, we have no reason to expect that the
distribution of originators by reputation levels will be concentrated close to the indiﬀerence point.
In a dynamic model with learning by market participants, we argue that originators’ reputations
are likely to be clustered. The reason is that in models like ours, the reputation levels of high quality
originators have an upward trend over time resulting in the reputation levels of many high quality
originators tending to become similar in the long run. We show that in an inﬁnitely repeated
version of our model, the long run or invariant distribution of reputation levels displays signiﬁcant
clustering. This clustering in turn implies that small changes in fundamentals can lead a large
number of originators to change their decisions when the fundamentals are close to the point of
indiﬀerence. A related result is that small changes in collateral values when these values are far
away from the point of indiﬀerence do not lead to large changes in the volume of new issuances.
The fragility of equilibrium in our model implies that it is consistent with the observed large
ﬂuctuations in the volume of new issuances in the market for asset backed securities. Figure 1
displays the volume of new issuances of asset-backed securities for various categories from the ﬁrst
quarter of 2000 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. The ﬁgure shows that the total volume of new issuances
of asset-backed securities rose from roughly $50 billion in the ﬁrst quarter of 2000 to roughly $300
billion in the fourth quarter of 2006. The volume of new issuances fell abruptly to roughly $100
billion in the third quarter of 2007 and then fell again to near zero in roughly the fourth quarter
of 2008. The ﬁgure also shows similar large ﬂuctuations in the volume of new issuances for each
category.
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) document a similar pattern for new issues of syndicated loans.
Figure 1, Panel-A of their paper shows that syndicated lending rose from roughly $300 billion in



























*No reliable data for Non-US RMBS after Q3 '08
Source: Morganmarkets, JP Morgan Chase
Figure 1: New Issuance of Asset Backed Securities (Source: JP Morgan Chase)
sharply thereafter and fell to roughly $100 billion by the third quarter of 2008.
The reduction in the volume of new issuances in the secondary market roughly coincided with
a reduction in collateral values. One way of seeing this coincidence is to consider the Case-Shiller
home price index (available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices). This index stopped
growing in late 2006 and declined through 2007. The coincidence of the reduction in the volume of
new issuances and the reduction in collateral values is consistent with our model.
White (2009) has argued that the United States experienced a boom bust cycle in securitization
of real estate assets in the 1920’s similar to its recent experience. Figure 2 displays the change in
the outstanding stock in real estate bonds in the 1920s based on data in Carter and Sutch (2006).
Such bonds were issued against single large commercial mortgages or pools of commercial or real
estate mortgages and were publicly traded. To make this data comparable to more recent data, we
scale the data from the 1920s by nominal GDP in 2009. Speciﬁcally, we multiply the change in the
nominal stock of outstanding debt in each year by ratio of the nominal GDP in 2009 to that in the
relevant year. This ﬁgure shows that the changes in the stock rose dramatically from essentially
50 in 1919 to an average of 145 billion dollars in the period from 1925 to 1928. The market then
collapsed sharply and changes in the stock fell to roughly 50 billion dollars in 1929. Such large


























Note: Data is annual change in real estate bonds divided by Nominal GDP at relevant year multiplied by 
Nominal GDP 2009.
Source: Carter, et. al., Historical Statistics, (2006)Series Dc904
Figure 2: Change in Stock of Real Estate Bonds 1920-1930
We have argued that our model is consistent with abrupt collapses in secondary loan markets.
Our model is also consistent with the widespread view among policymakers that such abrupt
collapses were associated with sharp increases in the ineﬃciency of the operation of such markets.
For example, the Treasury Department, in its Fact Sheet dated March 23, 2009 releasing details of
a proposed Public-Private Investment Program for Legacy Assets asserts,
“Secondary markets have become highly illiquid, and are trading at prices below where
they would be in normally functioning markets.” (Treasury Department 2009)
Similarly, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in a White Paper dated March 3, 2009 making
the case for the Temporary Asset Loan Facility (TALF) asserts that
6“Nontraditional investors such as hedge funds, which may otherwise be willing to invest
in these securities, have been unable to obtain funding from banks and dealers because
of a general reluctance to lend.” (TALF White Paper 2009)
In the wake of the 2007 collapse of secondary loan markets, policymakers proposed a variety
of programs intended to remedy ineﬃciencies in the market for securitized assets. Some of these
programs, such as the proposed Public-Private Partnership for purchasing assets held by distressed
ﬁnancial institutions, were not implemented. Others, such as TALF, were implemented. This
program allows participants to purchase securitized assets by borrowing from the Federal Reserve
and using the assets as collateral. To the extent that the interest rate charged by the Federal Reserve
is below market interest rates, this program is eﬀectively a subsidy for the private purchase of assets
in the secondary loan market. To the extent that the interest rate charged by the Federal Reserve
is at market interest rates, it is not clear why this program would be eﬀective.
We use our model to evaluate the eﬀects of various policies. One such policy which resembles
the Public-Private Partnership and the TALF program is that the government oﬀers to purchase
loans at prices at or above existing market values. Another policy, which is intended to capture
the eﬀects of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy actions, is to change the time path of interest
rates. In terms of purchase policies, we show that if the price is set below that level that prevails in
the positive reputational equilibrium, the policy by itself does not change equilibrium outcomes but
it does involve transfers to banks and implies that the government makes negative proﬁts. If the
purchase price is set at a suﬃciently high level, this policy can eliminate the fragility of equilibria.
At this high level, the policy also involves transfers to banks and implies that the government makes
negative proﬁts.
In terms of policies that change the time path of interest rates, we show that temporary decreases
in interest rates worsen the adverse selection problem. Interestingly, anticipated decreases in interest
rates in the future can have beneﬁcial current eﬀects by reducing the range of reputations over which
the economy has multiple equilibria.
71.1 Related Literature
Our work here is related to an extensive literature on adverse selection in asset markets, in-
cluding the work of Myers and Majluf (1984), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), and
Garleanu and Pedersen (2004) as well as to the related securitization literature, speciﬁcally, the
work of DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999) and DeMarzo (2005). We add to this literature by analyzing
how reputational incentives aﬀect adverse selection problems.
Our assumption that buyers have less information concerning the loan quality of a bank is in
line with a descriptive literature that argues that secondary loan markets feature adverse selection
(see, for example, the work of Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008),
and Arora et al. (2009)). Also, a growing literature provides data on the presence of adverse
selection in asset markets. For example, Downing et al. (2009) ﬁnd that loans which banks held on
their balance sheets yielded more on average relative to similar loans which they securitized and
sold. Drucker and Mayer (2008) argue that underwriters of prime mortgage-backed securities are
better informed than buyers and present evidence that these underwriters exploit their superior
information when trading in the secondary market. Speciﬁcally, the tranches that such underwriters
avoid bidding on exhibit much worse-than-average ex-post performance than the tranches that they
do bid on.
Our work is also related to an extensive literature on reputation. Kreps and Wilson (1982) and
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) argue that equilibrium outcomes are better in models with reputa-
tional incentives than in models without them. In the banking literature, Diamond (1989) develops
this argument. More recently, Mailath and Samuelson (2001) analyze the role of reputational incen-
tives in inﬁnite horizon economies and provide conditions under which they can improve outcomes.
In contrast, Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki (2003) and Ely et al. (2008) describe models in which reputational
incentives can worsen outcomes. Our work here combines the results in this literature by showing
that reputational models can have multiple equilibria. In some of these equilibria, reputational
incentives can generate better outcomes; in others, worse. Furthermore, using techniques from
the global games literature, we develop a reﬁnement that produces a unique, fragile equilibrium.
Perhaps the work most closely related to ours is that of Ordo˜ nez (2008). An important diﬀerence
between our work and his is that our model has equilibria that are worse than the static equilib-
8rium, so that reputational incentives can lead to outcomes that are ex-post less eﬃcient than in a
model without these incentives.
Our analysis of policy is closely related to recent work by Philippon and Skreta (2009) who
analyze a variety of policies in a model with adverse selection. The main diﬀerence with our work
is that we focus on the incentives induced by reputation while they analyze a static model.
2 Reputation in a Secondary Loan Market Model
We develop a ﬁnite horizon model of the secondary loan market and use the model to demonstrate
how adverse selection and reputation interact to yield abrupt collapses with increased ineﬃciency.
We begin with a static version of our benchmark model. We use the unique equilibrium of
this model to construct equilibria in a repeated ﬁnite horizon model. We show that reputational
equilibria typically exhibit dynamic coordination problems in the sense that for a wide range of pa-
rameters, the repeated model has multiple equilibria. Although reputation is always valued, across
the diﬀerent equilibria loan originators choose diﬀerent actions based on the diﬀerent inferences
future buyers draw from the current actions of originators.
2.1 Static Model: A Unique Equilibrium
We start with the static model. This model can also be interpreted as describing the last period
of a ﬁnite horizon model. We show that the static model has a unique equilibrium in which the
equilibrium outcomes depend on the informed originator’s reputation.
2.1.1 Agents and Timing
The model has three types of agents: a loan originator referred to as a bank, a continuum of buyers,
and a continuum of lenders. All agents are risk neutral.
The bank is endowed with a risky loan indexed by π. The loan can also be thought of more
generally as an investment opportunity such as a project, a mortgage, or an asset-backed security.
Each loan requires q units of inputs, which represents the loan’s size. A loan of type π yields a
return of v = ¯ v with probability π and v = v with probability 1 − π at the end of the period. For
the analysis in this section, we normalize v to 0. Later, when we allow for aggregate shocks and
9introduce our reﬁnement, we will allow v to be a random variable, possibly diﬀerent from zero. We
assume that π ∈ {π, ¯ π} with π < ¯ π. We refer to a bank which has a loan of type ¯ π as a high quality
bank and one with a loan of type π as a low quality bank. We assume that π¯ v ≥ q so that each loan
has positive net present value if sold.
The bank can either sell the loan in a secondary market or it can hold the loan. Selling the
loan at a price p yields a payoﬀ to the bank of p − q. The purchaser of the loan is entitled to the
resulting return. If the bank chooses to hold the loan, it must borrow q from lenders to ﬁnance
the loan and repay q(1 + r) at the end of the period, where r is the within-period interest rate
paid to lenders. We allow r to be positive or negative in order to examine the eﬀects of various
policy experiments described below. If the bank holds the loan it is entitled to the return from
its projects; however, the bank then incurs a cost of holding the loan, c, in addition to the cost of
repaying its debt, q(1 + r).
Besides the quality of its loan, the bank is indexed by a cost type, which represents the costs,
relative to the marketplace, that the bank incurs when it holds the loan to maturity. We intend the
cost of the loan to represent funding liquidity costs, servicing costs, renegotiation costs in the event
of a loan default, and costs associated with holding a loan that may be correlated in a particular
way with the rest of the bank’s portfolio, among other potential factors. We assume that c ∈ {c,¯ c}
with c < −qr < 0 < ¯ c. We refer to a bank of type ¯ c as a high cost bank and a bank of type c as a
low cost bank. We normalize the cost of holding and managing the loan for the market to be zero.
We assume the quality type and cost types are drawn independently of each other.
Hence, the model has four types of banks: (π,c) ∈ {π, ¯ π} × {c,¯ c}. We refer to the diﬀerent
types of banks, (¯ π,¯ c),(¯ π,c),(π,¯ c),(π,c), as, HH, HL, LH, LL banks, respectively.
Timing of the Static Game
We formalize the interactions in this economy as an extensive form game with the following timing.
1. Nature draws the quality and cost types of the bank.
2. Buyers simultaneously oﬀer a price to purchase a loan, p.
3. The bank sells the loan to one of the buyers or holds the loan to maturity.
10We assume that, as perceived by buyers and lenders, the bank has quality type ¯ π with probability
µ2 and quality type π with probability 1 − µ2. (The subscript 2 on the probability is meant to
indicate that these are the beliefs of lenders associated with the second period of our two period
model described below.) Following the work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts
(1982), we refer to µ2 as the bank’s reputation. Also, buyers believe that the bank has cost type
c with probability α and cost type ¯ c with probability 1 − α. The cost and quality types are
independently drawn.
2.1.2 Strategy and Equilibrium
A strategy for the bank consists of a decision of whether to sell or hold its loan, and which buyer
to sell to if the bank chooses to sell. Clearly, the bank will choose the buyer oﬀering the highest
price if the bank decides to sell, so we suppress this aspect of the bank’s strategy. Let a denote
the decision of the bank whether to sell or hold the loan. If the bank chooses to sell, we denote the
decision by a = 1, and if the bank chooses to hold the loan, we denote the decision by a = 0. A
strategy for the bank is a function a( ) which maps the highest oﬀered price, p, into a decision of
whether to sell or hold the loan. The payoﬀs to a type (π,c) bank are given by
w2(a|p,π,c) = a(p − q) + (1 − a)[π¯ v − q(1 + r) − c]
A strategy for a buyer consists of the choice of a price to oﬀer a bank for its loan. The payoﬀs
to a buyer with an accepted price p and a strategy a2( |π,c) for each type of bank is
u2(p|a2) = Eπ,c[v|a2(p|π,c) = 1] − p.
Since buyers move simultaneously, they engage in a form of Bertrand competition, so that the price
is equal to the expected return of the loan.
A (pure strategy) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a price p2 and a strategy for each bank type,
a2( |π,c), such that for all p, each bank type chooses the optimal loan decision and buyers oﬀer the
highest price that yields a payoﬀ of 0; i.e., p2 ∈ max{p|u2(p|r,a2) = 0}.
Before characterizing the equilibria of this game, we characterize the outcomes under full in-
11formation, when the bank’s type is known by buyers. When buyers and lenders are informed of
the bank’s type, (π,c), Bertrand competition among buyers implies that the price in the secondary
loan market is p = π¯ v. Consider the decision of whether to sell or hold a loan by a bank of type
(π,c). Facing a price p, the bank chooses to sell the loan in the secondary market if and only if
p − q ≥ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − c.
Since Bertrand competition implies that the price p = π¯ v , the bank sells if and only if
qr + c ≥ 0
which can also be written as c ≥ −qr. Since we have assumed that c < −qr < 0 < ¯ c, in equilibrium
if the bank has a high cost, it sells its loan while if it has a low cost it holds its loan.
Notice that the equilibrium allocation under full information is ex-post eﬃcient. Low cost banks
have a comparative advantage (over the market) in holding loans to maturity while the market has
a comparative advantage over high cost banks. The full information equilibrium allocates loans to
agents with a comparative advantage in holding and managing the loan. Thus, if the bank has a
low cost of holding and managing the loan, it holds its loan, and if the bank has a high cost of
holding and managing the loan, it sells its loan.
Next, we characterize the equilibria of the game with private information. For expositional
simplicity, we focus on the decisions of the high quality, high cost bank (HH) and restrict the
strategy sets of the low cost type banks as well as the low quality, high cost bank. Speciﬁcally,
we assume that the low cost type banks hold their loans while the LH bank sells its loan. In
Proposition 3 below, we show that, if c is suﬃciently negative, the assumed strategies for these
three types of banks are indeed optimal. In terms of the strategy of the HH bank, we show that
it can be characterized by a threshold level of µ2, which we denote by µ∗
2, such that below µ∗
2, the
high quality, high cost type bank holds its loan, and above µ∗
2, this type sells its loan.
Consider now the loan decision of the high quality, high cost (HH) bank. The HH bank sells if
and only if
p − q ≥ ¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c. (1)
12Note that (1) implies that if the HH bank is willing to sell at any price, it is also willing to sell
at a higher price. This result implies that, in any equilibrium, Bertrand competition drives buyers
proﬁts to zero. In terms of buyers’ decisions, note that at any candidate equilibrium price, the HH
bank either sells or holds its loan. Consider a candidate price at which the HH bank sells. Then,
with probability µ2, the selling bank is a high quality bank. Since we have assumed that a low
quality high cost bank always sells, with probability (1−µ2) the selling bank is low quality. Thus,
Bertrand competition among buyers implies that any candidate equilibrium price at which the HH
bank sells must satisfy the following equality:
ˆ p(µ2) := [µ2¯ π + (1 − µ2)π] ¯ v. (2)
At a candidate price at which the HH bank holds, only the low quality bank sells so that the
equilibrium price must satisfy
p = π¯ v. (3)
When facing the highest possible price, ˆ p(µ2), the HH bank sells if and only if
ˆ p(µ2) − q ≥ ¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c
or, substiuting from (2),
[µ2¯ π + (1 − µ2)π] ¯ v − q ≥ ¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c. (4)
Let µ∗
2 be the value of reputation such that the HH bank is indiﬀerent between selling and holding
at ˆ p(µ2). Then, at any interior value of reputation, µ∗
2 must satisfy
[µ∗
2¯ π + (1 − µ∗
2)π] ¯ v − q = ¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c
or
µ∗
2 = 1 −
qr + ¯ c
(¯ π − π)¯ v
. (5)
Clearly for µ2 ≥ µ∗
2, our model has an equilibrium in which the HH bank sells its loan at a price
13ˆ p(µ2). If µ2 < µ∗
2, our model has an equilibrium in which the HH bank holds its loan and buyers
oﬀer a price p = π¯ v. To see that this equilibrium is unique, note that if µ2 ≥ µ∗
2, if the oﬀered price
is below ˆ p(µ2), one of the buyers can deviate and oﬀer a price just below ˆ p(µ2) and induce the HH
bank to sell. This deviation yields strictly positive proﬁts.
We use this characterization of the static equilibrium to calculate the payoﬀs associated with
a given level of reputation µ2 at the beginning of the period before a bank’s cost type is realized.





¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − Ec, µ2 < µ∗
2
(1 − α){[µ2¯ π + (1 − µ2)π]¯ v − q} + α[¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − c], µ2 ≥ µ∗
2.
(6)





(1 − α)[π¯ v − q] + α[π¯ v − q(1 + r) − c], µ2 < µ∗
2
(1 − α){[µ2¯ π + (1 − µ2)π]¯ v − q} + α[π¯ v − q(1 + r) − c], µ2 ≥ µ∗
2.
It is clear that V2 is weakly increasing and convex in µ2. We have proved the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1 If π¯ v > q and qr + ¯ c > 0, then for any µ ∈ [0,1], the static model has a unique
equilibrium. Let µ∗
2 be deﬁned by (5). For µ2 < µ∗
2, the equilibrium price is π¯ v and the HH bank
holds its loan. For µ2 ≥ µ∗
2, the equilibrium price is [µ2¯ π + (1 − µ2)π] ¯ v and the HH bank sells its
loan. Furthermore, the payoﬀ to the HH bank given in (6) is weakly increasing and convex in µ2.
Note that we have modeled buyers as behaving strategically. This modeling choice plays an
important role in ensuring that the static game has a unique equilibrium. Suppose that rather
than modeling buyers as behaving strategically, we had instead simply required that market prices
satisfy a zero proﬁt condition. One rationale for this requirement is that buyers take prices as given
and choose how many loans to buy as in a competitive equilibrium. It is easy to show that with
this requirement the economy has multiple equilibria in the static game if µ2 ≥ µ∗
2. One of these
equilibria corresponds to the unique equilibrium of our game. In the other equilibrium, the buyers
oﬀer a price of π¯ v. At this oﬀered price, the HH bank holds its loan and only the low quality,
14high cost banks sells its loan. We ﬁnd multiplicity of this kind unattractive in our model because
obvious bilateral gains to trade are not being exploited. Each of the buyers has a strong incentive
to oﬀer a price slightly below [µ2¯ π + (1 − µ2)π] ¯ v. At this oﬀered price, the HH bank strictly prefers
to sell, and the buyer making such an oﬀer makes strictly positive proﬁts. In our formulation, with
strategic behavior by the buyers, this low price outcome cannot be an equilibrium.
While we prefer our strategic formulation, we emphasize that our results that reputational
incentives induce multiplicity do not rely on the static game having a unique equilibrium. We
chose a formulation in which the static game has a unique equilibrium in order to argue that
reputational incentives by themselves can induce multiplicity.
2.2 Two Period Benchmark Model
Consider now a two-period repetition of our static game in which the bank’s quality type is the
same in both periods. We assume that the bank’s second period payoﬀs are discounted at rate β.
In period 1, a continuum of buyers who are present in the market for only one period choose to
oﬀer prices for loans sold in that period. In period 2, a new set of buyers each oﬀer prices for loans
sold in that period. This new set of buyers observes whether the bank sold or held its loan in the
previous period, and, if the bank sold its loan, buyers observe the realized value of the loan. If the
loan is held, we assume that period 2 buyers do not observe the realized value of the loan.
The timing of the game is an extension of that described in the static game. As in that game,
at the beginning of period 1, nature draws the bank’s quality and cost type. We assume that the
bank’s quality type is ﬁxed for both periods. At the beginning of period 2, nature draws a new
cost type for the bank. In any period, the bank’s quality and cost types are unknown to buyers.
The timing within each period is the same as in the static game. We also assume that the returns
to successful loans, v = ¯ v, and to unsuccessful loans, v = 0, are the same in both periods.
In order to deﬁne an equilibrium in this repeated game, we must develop language that will
allow us to describe how second period buyers update their beliefs about the bank’s type based on
observations from period 1. To do so, we let the public history at the beginning of period 2 be
denoted by θ1 where θ1 ∈ {h,s0,s¯ v} where θ1 = h denotes that the bank held its loan in period 1,
θ1 = s0 denotes that the bank sold its loan and the loan paid oﬀ v = 0, and θ1 = s¯ v denotes that
the bank sold its loan and the loan paid oﬀ v = ¯ v.
15As in the static game, we focus on the strategic incentives of the HH bank and restrict the
strategy sets of the low cost type banks as well as the low quality, high cost bank. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that the low cost type banks must hold their loans while the LH bank must sell its loan. A
strategy for the high cost, high quality bank is now given by a pair of functions, a1(p1) representing
the decision in period 1 and a2(p2,θ1) representing the loan decision in period 2, if the bank realizes
a high cost in period 2, as a function of oﬀered prices.
Consider next how the buyers in the last period update their beliefs about the bank’s type.
This update depends through Bayes rule on the prior belief of the buyers, the loan decision of the
bank and the loan return realization if the bank sold, as well as on the ﬁrst period strategies chosen
by the HH bank and period 1 buyers. From Bayes rule, these posterior probabilities are given by
µ2(µ1,θ1 = h,a1( ),p1) =
µ1 (α + (1 − α)(1 − a1(p1)))
µ1 (α + (1 − α)(1 − a1(p1))) + (1 − µ1)α
(7)
µ2(µ1,θ1 = s¯ v,a1( ),p1) =
µ1a1(p1)(1 − α)¯ π
µ1a1(p1)(1 − α)¯ π + (1 − µ1)(1 − α)π
(8)
µ2(µ1,θ1 = s0,a1( ),p1) =
µ1a1(p1)(1 − α)(1 − ¯ π)
µ1a1(p1)(1 − α)(1 − ¯ π) + (1 − µ1)(1 − α)(1 − π)
(9)
For notational convenience, we suppress the dependence on strategies and priors and let µh
denote the posterior associated with the bank holding its loan, and µs¯ v and µs0 denote the posteriors
associated with selling and yielding a high or low return.
Given the updating rules, the period 1 payoﬀs for the HH bank are given by
w1(a|p) =a[p − q + β (¯ πV2(µs¯ v) + (1 − ¯ π)V2(µs0))]
+ (1 − a)[(¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c) + βV2(µh)]
where µh,µs¯ v, and µs0 are given by equations (7), (8), and (9). Buyers’ payoﬀs associated with an
accepted price, p, in period t are given by
ut(p|r,at,µt) =
µt(1 − α)at(p)¯ π + (1 − µt)(1 − α)π
µt(1 − α)at(p) + (1 − µt)(1 − α)
¯ v − p.
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a ﬁrst period price, p1, a ﬁrst period loan decision for the
high quality, high cost bank a1( ) which maps accepted prices into loan decisions, updating rules
16µh,µs¯ v,µs0 which map observations on loan decisions into posterior beliefs, a second period price,
p2, which maps second period beliefs into prices, and a second period loan decision a2( ) which
maps accepted prices and histories into loan decisions such that
1. for all p, the HH bank chooses the optimal action in period 1 so that w1(a1(p)|p) ≥ maxa′ w1(a|p),
2. for all p, the HH bank chooses the optimal action in period 2 so that w2(a1(p)|p) ≥ maxa′ w2(a|p),
3. the ﬁrst period price, p1 satisﬁes p1 ∈ max{p|u1(p|a1) = 0},
4. the second period price, p2 satisﬁes p2 ∈ max{p|u2(p|a2) = 0},
5. the updating rules, µh,µs¯ v,µs0 satisfy Bayes’ Rule, namely, (7), (8), and (9).
Next, we characterize the set of equilibria in the two period game under the following assump-
tion,
Assumption 1 α and β satisfy β(1 − α) ≤ 1.
Later we provide a partial characterization of the set of equilibria when this assumption is
relaxed.
We show that the game has two equilibria for a range of period 1 reputations, µ1 around the
static threshold, µ∗
2. In one equilibrium, the HH bank chooses to sell its loan in period 1. The
posteriors associated with selling now depend non-trivially on the realized values of the loan. In
particular, when the loan has a high realized value, the bank is rewarded with a higher posterior,
and when the loan has a low realized value, the bank’s posterior is lower than its prior. The
posterior associated with holding the loan is exactly equal to the bank’s period 1 reputation. These
posteriors provide reputational incentives for the HH bank to sell the loan in order to signal its type
and receive a higher period 2 reputation. Notice, for an HH bank with initial reputation above the
static threshold, µ∗
2, the bank’s equilibrium strategy coincides with repetition of the static perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, but for HH banks with reputations below the static threshold, reputational
incentives dominate their static incentives.
In the second type of equilibrium, the HH bank chooses to hold its loan. In this equilibrium,
uninformed agents believe that the only type of bank that sells its loan is the LH bank. Hence,
17regardless of the return of the loan, if the bank sells it receives a posterior reputation of 0. Because
uninformed agents believe that high quality banks hold their loans, the posterior associated with
holding the loan is higher than the prior reputation. These posteriors provide reputational incen-
tives for the bank to hold its loan in order to signal its type. In this equilibrium, the action of HH
banks with reputations below the static threshold coincides with repetition of the static perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. High quality, high cost banks with reputations above the static threshold
now hold their loan because of reputational concerns. In this sense, reputation is harmful as it
induces high quality, high cost banks to hold their loans while in a static setting the market place
can oﬀer a suﬃciently high price to induce these banks to sell their loans.
To see these results, consider ﬁrst supporting equilibria in which the HH bank chooses to sell
its loan in period 1. In this case, the period 1 price is given by equation ˆ p(µ1). Given this price,
selling is optimal if the diﬀerence in payoﬀs between selling and holding the loan is non-negative,
or if the following incentive constraint is satisﬁed:
(µ1¯ π + (1 − µ1)π) ¯ v − q + β (¯ πV2(µs¯ v) + (1 − ¯ π)V2(µs0)) ≥ ¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c + βV2(µh) (10)
or if
µ1(¯ π − π)¯ v + β (¯ πV2(µs¯ v) + (1 − ¯ π)V2(µs0) − V2(µh)) ≥ (¯ π − π)¯ v − (qr + ¯ c)
where
µh = µ1, µs¯ v =
µ1¯ π
µ1¯ π + (1 − µ1)π
, and µs0 =
µ1(1 − ¯ π)
µ1(1 − ¯ π) + (1 − µ1)(1 − π)
(11)
We will show that there is some value of µ, denoted µ < µ∗
2 such that for all µ1 ≥ µ, the
inequality in (10) holds so that the HH bank sells its loan in period 1. To show this result, the
following lemma is useful. This lemma also plays a key role in our proof that in an inﬁnite horizon
version of our model, reputation levels tend to cluster.
Lemma 1 If the HH bank sells its loan in the ﬁrst period, then ¯ πµs¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)µs0 ≥ µh.
Proof. From (11) we have (as an implication of Bayes Rule) that if the HH bank sells its loan in












Since 1/µ is a convex function, it follows that
¯ πµs¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)µs0 ≥ µ1 = µh. (12)
Let the reputational gain be deﬁned as
∆g(µ1) = β (¯ πV2(µs¯ v) + (1 − ¯ π)V2(µs0) − V2(µh))
Recall from Proposition 1 that V2 is a convex function, so that ¯ πV2(µs¯ v) + (1 − ¯ π)V2(µs0) ≥
V2(¯ πµs¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)µs0). This convexity together with Lemma 1 implies that at µ∗
2, ∆g(µ∗
2) > 0 so
that the left side of (10) is strictly greater than the right side. This result implies that, as we show
in the Appendix, our model has an equilibrium in which there is some value of µ, denoted µ < µ∗
2
such that at µ, (10) holds as an equality and for all µ1 ≥ µ, the inequality in (10) holds.
Now consider the equilibrium in which the HH bank holds its loan in period 1. In this case the
equilibrium price is given π¯ v. A bank holds its loan if and only if




µ1 + (1 − µ1)α
, and µs¯ v = µs0 = 0
If the inequality in (13) is reversed, there is a deviation by buyer to price ˆ p(µ1) that would break
down the equilibrium. Analogously to the positive equilibrium, we deﬁne the reputational gain as
∆b(µ1) = β(V2(0) − V2(µh))
Since µh > µ1,using Proposition 1, ∆b(µ∗
2) < 0 so that (13) holds as a strict inequality. This
19result implies that, as we show in the Appendix, our model has an equilibrium in which there is
some value of µ, denoted ¯ µ > µ∗
2 such that at ¯ µ, (13) holds as an equality and for all µ1 ≤ ¯ µ, the
inequality in (13) holds.
We have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Multiplicity of Equilibria) Suppose Assumption (1) is satisﬁed and 0 < µ∗
2 < 1.
Then, there exist µ and ¯ µ with µ < µ∗
2 < ¯ µ such that
1. if µ1 ∈ [µ, ¯ µ), the model has two equilibria: in one the HH bank sells its loan, and in the other
the HH bank holds its loan,
2. if µ1 < µ, the model has a unique equilibrium in which the HH bank holds its loan in period
1,
3. if µ1 ≥ ¯ µ, the model has a unique equilibrium in which the HH bank sells its loan in period 1.
Next we provide a partial characterization of the set of equilibria when we relax Assumption
(1). We show that even when this assumption is relaxed, the game has a region of multiplicity near
µ∗
2. We have also shown that multiplicity can arise for values of µ close to 1. Details are available
upon request.
Proposition 3 (Region of Multiplicity). There exist µ and ¯ µ with µ < µ∗
2 < ¯ µ such that if
µ1 ∈ [µ, ¯ µ), the game has two equilibria: in one the HH bank sells its loan, and in the other the HH
bank holds its loan.
Therefore, we have shown that introducing reputation as a device for mitigating lemons problems
results in equilibrium multiplicity, that is, reputation can both be a blessing and a curse. The game
has a positive reputational equilibrium in which, encouraged by reputational incentives, banks with
a high quality asset sell their asset. In this equilibrium, reputation helps sustain market activity
in a market that would be illiquid without reputational incentives. The game also has a negative
reputational equilibrium in which reputational incentives discourage selling and banks with a high
quality asset hold on to their asset. In this equilibrium, reputation helps depress market activity
in a market that would be liquid without reputational incentives.
20It is straightforward to extend this two period model to a multi-period model. (Indeed, we
extend a version of the model with a reﬁnement that produces a unique equilibrium to a multi-
period model below). It is also straightforward to see that a version of our model with three or
more periods will feature multiple equilibria. In addition to the multiplicity demonstrated in the
two period model, a model with three or more periods will feature multiplicity induced by trigger
strategies as in Benoit and Krishna (1985).
A version of our model with three or more periods can generate sudden collapses in the volume
of loans sold in secondary markets. To see these sudden collapses, consider a version of our model
with three or more periods. The equilibrium outcomes in the last two periods of such a model clearly
coincide with the equilibrium outcomes of our two period model. Suppose that in the ﬁrst period
of the three period model, the equilibrium coincides with the analog of the positive reputational
equilibrium so that new issue volumes are large. Suppose that in the next to last period, banks
and buyers observe a ‘sunspot’ at the beginning of the period. This sunspot acts as a coordinating
device which allows agents to select amongst the equilibria. If the sunspot is such that private
agents choose the positive equilibrium, the volume of loans that are sold in secondary markets is
high, while if the sunspot is such that private agents choose the negative equilibrium, the volume of
loans sold in secondary markets is low. In this sense, a multi-period version of our model generates
sudden collapses in the volume of trade.
To draw an analogy to models of reputation as incomplete information, our model nests
features of the model in Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Ordo˜ nez (2008) as well as that of
Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki (2003). In Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Ordo˜ nez (2008), strategic types
are good and want to separate from non-strategic types - though in Mailath and Samuelson (2001)
reputation generally fails to deliver this type of equilibria. Nevertheless, in their environments,
there is no long run reputational loss from good behavior. Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki (2003), share the
property that strategic types are good and want to separate, however, structure of learning is such
that good behavior never implies long-run positive reputational gains and therefore reputational
incentives exacerbate bad behavior in equilibrium.
Recall that thus far, we have restricted the strategies of all bank types except the HH type.
Under a suﬃcient condition that c is suﬃciently negative, we can show that the assumed strategies
are optimal. This suﬃcient condition is given by
21Assumption 2
(¯ π − π) ¯ v + qr + max
µ1∈[0,1]
∆g(µ1) < −c (14)
We then have the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1 and Assumption (2) hold. Then the unique equilibrium of
the static game described in Proposition 1 and the multiple equilibria of the dynamic game described
in Proposition 2 are also equilibria of the associated games when all bank types behave strategically.
2.3 Sudden Collapses and Increased Ineﬃciency
In this section, we study the eﬃciency properties of the positive and the negative reputational equi-
libria. We provide suﬃcient conditions under which the positive reputational equilibrium Pareto
dominates the negative reputational equilibrium in the sense of interim utility (see Holmstrom and Myerson
(1983)), and suﬃcient conditions under which the positive equilibrium dominates the negative equi-
librium in the sense of ex-ante utility. In this sense, sudden collapses of trade volume in our model
due to switches between equilibria are associated with increased ineﬃciency.
In order to develop these suﬃcient conditions, suppose that µ1 ∈ [µ,µ∗
2] and that in the negative
equilibrium, posterior beliefs conditional on future buyers observing a hold decision by a bank in
the ﬁrst period, µn
h, are less than the static cutoﬀ, µ∗
2. Consider the diﬀerence in utility level of
high quality high cost bank in the two equilibria. This diﬀerence is given by:
∆U(¯ π,¯ c) = ˆ p(µ1) − (¯ π¯ v − qr − ¯ c) + β [¯ πV2(µ
p






s¯ v and µ
p





V2( ) is constant for µ ≤ µ∗
2, it follows that V2(µn
h) = V2(µ
p
h). Then, from (10), it is clear that
∆U(¯ π,¯ c) ≥ 0. The diﬀerence in utility level of a low quality high cost bank is given by
∆U(π,¯ c) = ˆ p(µ1) − π¯ v + β [πW2(µ
p
s¯ v) + (1 − π)W2(µ
p
s0) − πW2(µn
s¯ v) + (1 − π)W2(µn
s0)]
Note that µn
s¯ v = µn
s0 = 0. Therefore, the diﬀerence in continuation value is positive. Since the price





the continuation values for low cost types is the same in the two equilibrium and since they are
22holding in the ﬁrst period, their utility levels are the same. Since buyers make zero proﬁts in both
equilibria, we have established the following proposition:






) < β(1 − α) and suppose µ1 is close to µ. Then,
the utility level for each type of bank and the buyers in the positive equilibrium is at least as large
as the utility level for the corresponding type of bank and the buyers in the negative equilibrium.






) ≤ β(1 − α) is a suﬃcient condition for µn
h
to be less than or equal to µ∗
2.
In the case that µn
h > µ∗
2, one can show that the utility level of the low cost types is lower
in the positive reputational equilibrium than in the negative reputational equilibria. Hence, the
two equilibria are not comparable in interim utility terms. However, under appropriate suﬃcient
conditions, the positive equilibrium yields a higher ex-ante utility than the negative equilibrium.
Consider, the allocations in the two equilibria in the ﬁrst period. The only diﬀerence in allocations
is that, in the positive equilibrium the high quality high cost type sells while in the negative
equilibrium this type holds. Thus diﬀerence in ex-ante utility (or social surplus) in the ﬁrst period
between the two equilibria is given by
(1 − α)µ(qr + ¯ c).
Clearly, ﬁrst period utility is higher in the positive equilibrium than in the negative equilibrium.
However, in the second period social surplus is higher in the negative equilibrium than in the
positive equilibrium because the high cost types always sell in the negative equilibrium whereas in
the positive equilibrium they hold the asset some fraction of the time - when the signal quality is
bad in the ﬁrst period or after a hold decision in the ﬁrst period. Therefore, the change in social
surplus in the second period is given by
−µ(1 − α)((1 − α)(1 − ¯ π) + α)(qr + ¯ c)
Thus, the overall change in the social surplus is given by
µ(1 − α)(1 − β(1 − ¯ π(1 − α)))(qr + ¯ c)
23Clearly, this overall change is positive if and only if β(1 − ¯ π(1 − α)) < 1. We have established the
following proposition:
Proposition 6 Suppose that β(1− ¯ π(1−α)) < 1. Then the ex-ante utility of the bank is higher in
the positive reputational equilibrium than in the negative reputational equilibrium and the ex-ante
utility of the buyers is the same in the two equilibria.
3 Adding Aggregate Shocks
Consider a version of our benchmark model with aggregate shocks to collateral values, namely the
default value of the loans banks originate. One motivation for adding aggregate shocks is that
sudden collapses seem to be associated with reductions in collateral values. Speciﬁcally, we will
assume that v ﬂuctuates randomly. Notice that under our formulation, in the event of no default,
the payoﬀ from the loan, ¯ v, is not random while in the event of default, the payoﬀ from the loan, v
is subject to aggregate shocks. In the event of no default, the payment on a loan such as a mortgage
is known in advance, while in the event of default the amount the lender collects depends on the
value of the collateral. To the extent that this value is correlated across diﬀerent types of loans,
the payoﬀ in the event of default ﬂuctuates in the same way across a wide variety of loans. The
obvious example is that of a mortgage on residential or commercial property. The value of such
property is often subject to aggregate shocks.
We begin with a version of our static model. Suppose that v is drawn from some distribution
F(v) with ﬁnite mean at the beginning of the period. We will show that in the static model, the
unique equilibrium is characterized by a cutoﬀ threshold µ∗
2(v) such that banks with reputation
models above µ∗
2(v) sell their loans and banks below this threshold hold their loans and a fall in v
raises µ∗
2(v). In this sense a fall in collateral values worsens the adverse selection problem. To see
this result, note that an HH bank sells its loan if and only if
ˆ p(µ2) − q ≥ ¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c. (15)
where
ˆ p(µ2) := [µ2¯ π + (1 − µ2)π] ¯ v + [µ2(1 − ¯ π) + (1 − µ2)(1 − π)]v. (16)
24Substituting for ˆ p(µ2) from (16) into (15) and simplifying, we obtain
[µ2¯ π + (1 − µ2)π](¯ v − v) − q ≥ ¯ π(¯ v − v) − q(1 + r) − ¯ c. (17)
From (17), we obtain that µ∗
2(v) is given by
µ∗
2(v) = 1 −
qr + ¯ c
(¯ π − π)(¯ v − v)
.
Clearly µ∗
2(v) is decreasing in v.
The dynamic model with aggregate shocks has multiple equilibria. Consider a version of our
dynamic model in which the default value vt, t = 1.2 is drawn independently over time from a
distribution F with ﬁnite mean. The argument for multiplicity is essentially the same as in the
dynamic model without aggregate shocks. The proof of the following Proposition mirrors the proof
of Proposition 2 and is omitted.
Proposition 7 For every v1 such that 0 < µ∗
2(v1) < 1, there exists functions µ(v1) and ¯ µ(v1)
satisfying µ(v1) < µ∗
2(v1) < ¯ µ(v1) such that for all µ1 ∈ [µ(v1), ¯ µ(v1)], the model with aggregate
shocks has two equilibria. In one equilibrium, the HH bank sells its asset in period 1 and equilibrium
price is pH
1 (v1) = [µ2¯ π + (1 − µ2)π] ¯ v + [µ2(1 − ¯ π) + (1 − µ2)(1 − π)]v1 (= ˆ p(µ2;v1)). In the other
equilibrium, the HH bank holds the loan period 1 and the equilibrium price is given by pL
1(v1) =
π¯ v + (1 − π)v1.
Thus, since the model with aggregate shocks has multiple equilibria, it suﬀers from the same
Dynamic Coordination Problem as the model without aggregate shocks.
4 Aggregate Shocks and Imperfect Observability
In this section, we use a perturbation of the model with aggregate shocks in order to select a unique
equilibrium. The method used is in the spirit of the reﬁnement literature on static coordination
games (see, for example, Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (2003).)
We use a reﬁnement which selects a unique equilibrium for two reasons. One reason is that we
would like to understand how outcomes in the model respond to various kinds of policy interven-
25tions. As is typically the case in models with multiple equilibria, comparative static exercises are
not meaningful. Therefore, we seek a reﬁnement that allows us to select a unique equilibrium. The
other reason is that we want to establish a well deﬁned notion of fragility. In many macroeconomic
environments with multiple equilibria, small shocks to the environment can cause sudden changes
in behavior. Without a selection device, multiplicity leads to a lack of discipline on how equilibrium
behavior changes in response to shocks. Techniques adapted from the literature on coordination
games, however, enable us to impose such discipline. We demonstrate the precise nature of fragility
in our environment using the unique equilibrium selected by our perturbation described below.
We adapt techniques from the literature on cordination games because, as we have noted in
Chari et al. (2009), we think of the multiplicity of equilibria in our environment as arising from a
coordination problem between future buyers and current banks, and hence refer to it as a Dynamic
Coordination Problem. To see the sense in which lack of coordination leads to multiplicity, suppose
that in period 1, period 2 buyers could commit to buy the asset in period 2 at pre-speciﬁed prices
contingent on observed realizations of asset quality. Then a bank whose quality type is just below
the quality threshold µ∗
2 has an incentive to sell the asset in period 1. Such commitment would
eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria. The unique equilibrium with commitment is the positive
reputational equilibrium. This argument suggests that coordination failure is at the root of the
multiplicity result. This interpretation helps us develop a reﬁnement concept similar to that in the
coordination games literature.
Consider the following model with aggregate shocks and imperfect observability. In each period
t = 1,2, an aggregate shock vt ∼ F(vt) with ﬁnite mean is drawn. These shocks are drawn
independently across periods. Banks and buyers at the beginning of each period observe a noisy
signal of vt given by vt = vt + σεt where εt ∼ G(εt) with E [εt] = 0 is i.i.d. across periods and
σ > 0. We assume that F and G have full support over R.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. At the beginning of each period t, agents observe vt−1. Buyers do not observe previous period
signals vt−1 or the market price pt−1. (We believe that our uniqueness result goes through if
future buyers receive a noisy signal about previous prices.)
2. The new aggregate state vt is drawn, the bank and current period buyers do not observe the
26current state, vt, but they do observe the noisy signal, vt.
3. Buyer oﬀer prices.
4. The bank decides whether to sell or hold.
The payoﬀs of holding to a high cost high quality bank in period t is
¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)vt − q(1 + r) − ¯ c
Hence, when selling occurs, the payoﬀ from holding to the bank which has observed the signal
vd
t is
¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)E [vt|vt] − q(1 + r) − ¯ c
When σ > 0, the updating rules for the signal are given by
Pr(v1 ≤ ˆ v1|v1) = Pr(v1 + σε1 ≤ ˆ v) = G
 
ˆ v1 − v1
σ
 
Pr(v1 ≤ ˆ v1|v1) =















Assumption 3 (Monotone Likelihood Ratio) The posterior belief function H(v1|v1) is a decreasing
function of v1
The assumption implies that when the signal, v1, about the shock is high, the value of the shock,
v1, is likely to be high. Straightforward algebra can be used to show that this assumption is satisﬁed
if a monotone likelihood ratio property on g holds, namely that for any v1 > v′
1, g(v1−v1)/g(v′
1−v1)
is increasing in v1.
To develop conditions under which the equilibrium is unique, we begin with the second period.
Proposition 8 In the second period, given a reputation level µ2 and a default value signal v2, there





1 if µ2 ≥ µ∗
2(v2)
0 if µ2 < µ∗
2(v2)





[µ2¯ π + (1 − µ2)π] ¯ v + [µ2(1 − ¯ π) + (1 − µ2)(1 − π)]v2 if µ2 ≥ µ∗
2(v2)









qr + ¯ c





The equilibrium in the subgame in the second period is similar to the previous section. The
payoﬀ from holding to a HH bank is
¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)v2 − q(1 + r) − ¯ c
since E [v2|v2] = v2 and the payoﬀ from selling is [µ2¯ π + (1 − µ2)π] ¯ v+[µ2(1 − ¯ π) + (1 − µ2)(1 − π)]v2−
q (:= ˆ p(µ2;v2) − q.µ∗
2(v2)) is deﬁned as the value of reputation that makes the bank indiﬀerent be-
tween selling and holding. The equilibrium in the sub-game implies the following value function
for the bank:
ˆ V2(µ2,v2) = α[¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − c] + (1 − α)max{ˆ p(µ2;v2) − q, ¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)v2 − q(1 + r) − ¯ c}
and the ex-ante value of period 2 reputation is
V2(µ2) =







Proving that the perturbed game has a unique equilibrium is easiest when F is an improper
uniform distribution, U[−∞,∞]. However, an improper uniform implies that the ex-ante value
function, V2(µ2), is not well-deﬁned. To ease the exposition, in the next proposition we assume
that vt is distributed independently but not identically across periods. In particular, we assume
v1 is drawn from the improper uniform distribution while v2 is drawn from a proper distribution
F. In section 4.2, we state our result for the case where vt is i.i.d across periods and F is a proper
28distribution. Notice that if v1 is drawn from an improper uniform distribution,
H(v1|ˆ v1) = G
 
ˆ v1 − v1
σ
 
The next proposition states our uniqueness result.
Proposition 9 For each σ > 0 and V2(µ2) given by (18), the game with uniform improper priors
has a unique equilibrium in which in period 1, HH bank’s action is characterized by a cutoﬀ v∗
1(σ) ∈





1 if v1 ≥ v∗
1(σ)
0 if v1 < v∗
1(σ)






ˆ p(µ1;v1) if v1 ≥ v∗
1(σ)
π¯ v + (1 − π)v1 if v1 < v∗
1(σ)
We prove this proposition using a similar method to that in (Carlsson and Van Damme (1993).
We begin by restricting attention to switching strategies in which the bank sells for all default values
above a threshold and holds for all default values below that threshold. We show that the game
has a unique equilibrium in switching strategies. We then prove that the equilibrium switching
strategy is the only strategy that survives iterated elimination of strictly dominant strategies so
that we have a unique equilibrium.
The intuition for the iterated elimination argument is as follows. Note that we can deﬁne
equilibrium as a strategy for the bank in period 1, and a belief - about the bank’s action in period
1 - by period 2 buyers used for Bayesian updating. In equilibrium beliefs have to coincide with
strategies. Obviously reputational incentives depend on future buyers’ beliefs. When v1 is very
large, independent of future buyers’ beliefs, an HH bank sells the asset. Similarly, when v1 is very
low, an HH bank holds onto the asset, independent of future beliefs. This argument establishes
two bounds ˆ v1 > ˜ v1, such that any equilibrium strategy must prescribe a sale for v1 higher than ˆ v1
and holding for v1 lower than ˜ v1. This result means that the set of beliefs by future buyers have
to satisfy the same property. Limiting the set of beliefs puts tighter upper and lower bounds on
29reputational incentives, which in turn implies new bounds ˆ v2 > ˜ v2. We show that iterating in this
manner implies that the bounds ˆ vn and ˜ vn converge to a common limit.
Here we sketch the steps of the proof and leave the details to the Appendix.
4.1 Outline of Proof with Improper Priors
1. Unique Equilibrium in Switching Strategies
(a) Switching Strategies





1 v1 ≥ k
0 v1 < k
where k represents the switching point. We characterize the best response of the HH
bank when future buyers use dk to form their posteriors over the bank’s type. To do so,
we must deﬁne Bayesian updating.
(b) Bayesian Updating
Consider an arbitrary belief ˆ a1( ) by period 2 buyers about the HH bank’s period 1
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µsd(v1;ˆ a1) =
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+ (1 − µ1)π
(19)
µsd(v1;dk) =


































+ (1 − µ1)α
(c) Characterizing the Gain from Reputation
Given any belief ˆ a1, we deﬁne the gain from reputation as
∆(v1;ˆ a1) = β
 






In the appendix we prove the following Lemma which characterizes the gain from repu-
tation for general strategies and for switching strategies..
Lemma 2 The gain from reputation ∆(v1;ˆ a1) is uniformly bounded and strictly increas-
ing in ˆ a1 according to a point-wise ordering on beliefs. In particular, if ˆ a1 is a switching
strategy, dk, then ∆(v1;dk) is strictly decreasing in k. Moreover, when ˆ a1 is a switching
strategy, ∆(v1;ˆ a1) is strictly increasing in v1.
(d) Equilibrium in Switching Strategies
Facing a switching strategy belief of future buyers, dk, clearly, the HH bank sells if and
only if
ˆ p(µ1;v1) − q + ∆(v1;dk) ≥ ¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)v1 − q(1 + r) − ¯ c. (21)
Note that the value of selling, given by the left side of (21) is increasing in v1 and
its partial derivative with respect to v1 is at least the derivative of ˆ p(µ1;v1), given by
µ1(1 − ¯ π)+(1−µ1)π. The value of holding, given by the right side of (21) is increasing
in v1 and its derivative is 1 − ¯ π. Since the derivative for the value of selling is greater
31than the value of holding, there exists a unique solution, b(k), that solves the equation
ˆ p(µ1;b(k)) − q + ∆(b(k);dk) = ¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)b(k) − q(1 + r) − ¯ c.
Hence, the best response of the HH bank to a switching strategy belief of future buyers,
dk, is a switching strategy, db(k) in which the bank sells for all returns above b(k) and
holds for all return values below b(k). An equilibrium in switching strategies must be a
ﬁxed point of the above equation, so an equilibrium switching point, k∗ satisﬁes
ˆ p(µ1;k∗) − q + ∆(k∗;dk∗) = ¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)k∗ − q(1 + r) − ¯ c.
In the Appendix, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The best response function b(k) has a unique ﬁxed point k∗ which is globally
stable.
Hence, the game with switching strategies has a unique equilibrium.
2. Restriction to Switching Strategies is Without Loss of Generality
(a) Limit Dominance Regions
We show that regardless of future buyers belief functions, the bank has a dominant
strategy for extreme values of default values. Consider two numbers ˆ v < ˜ v. We deﬁne
an extreme monotone strategy to be a strategy that calls for selling when v1 ≥ ˜ v and
holding for v1 ≤ ˆ v. We deﬁne Aˆ v,˜ v to be the set of such strategies. Notice that A−∞,∞
is the set of all strategies. Deﬁne the Best Response set operator on a subset of beliefs,
A, as
BR(A) = {a1|a1(v1) = 1 ⇔ ˆ p(µ1;v1) − q + ∆(v1;ˆ a1) ≥ ¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)v1 − q(1 + r) − ¯ c}
We show that there exist bounds ˆ v0 < ˜ v0 such that the HH bank holds for v1 ≤ ˆ v0 and
32it sells the asset for v1 ≥ ˜ v0, independent of future buyers’ belief function ˆ a1. That is
∀ˆ a1,v1 ≥ ˜ v0; ˆ p(µ1;v1) − q + ∆(v1;ˆ a1) ≥ ¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)v1 − q(1 + r) − ¯ c (22)
∀ˆ a1,v1 ≤ ˆ v0; ˆ p(µ1;v1) − q + −q + ∆(v1;ˆ a1) ≤ ¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)v1 − q(1 + r) − ¯ c
Using the result from Lemma (2) that ∆(v1;ˆ a1) is uniformly bounded in (22), it follows
that these bounds exist. We have established that any equilibrium strategy must be an
extreme monotone strategy with cutoﬀs ˆ v0 < ˜ v0. That is,
BR(A−∞,∞) ⊆ Aˆ v0,˜ v0.
Thus, we can restrict attention to extreme monotone strategies without loss of generality.
(b) Best Response Sets Converge.
We show that the best response set operator is decreasing in the sense that it induces
a best response set which is a strict subset of any arbitrary set of extreme monotone
beliefs. Repeatedly applying this operator induces a decreasing sequence of sets which
converges to a unique equilibrium.
To show that the best response set operator is decreasing, we show that for any ˆ v < ˜ v,
BR(Aˆ v,˜ v) ⊆ Ab(ˆ v),b(˜ v) ⊂ Aˆ v,˜ v. Since ∆(v1;ˆ a1) is increasing in ˆ a1, for all ˆ a1 ∈ Aˆ v,˜ v we
have
ˆ p(µ1;v1) − q + ∆(v1;d˜ v) ≤ ˆ p(µ1;v1) − q + ∆(v1;ˆ a1) ≤ ˆ p(µ1;v1) − q + ∆(v1;dˆ v)
because ˆ a1 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates d˜ v and is dominated by dˆ v. This result
implies that
¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)v1 − q(1 + r) − ¯ c ≥ ˆ p(µ1;v1) − q + ∆(v1;ˆ a1)
if
¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)v1 − q(1 + r) − ¯ c ≥ ˆ p(µ1;v1) − q + ∆(v1;dˆ v)
33This result implies that if a1 is the best response to ˆ a1, then
∀v1 < b(ˆ v), a1(v1) = 0
Similarly, we can show that the best response to ˆ a1 must satisfy a1(v1) = 1 for all
v1 ≥ b(˜ v). We have proved that BR(Aˆ v,˜ v) ⊆ Ab(ˆ v),b(˜ v). Since b(k) is globally stable,
Ab(ˆ v),b(˜ v) ⊂ Aˆ v,˜ v so that BR(Aˆ v,˜ v) ⊆ Ab(ˆ v),b(˜ v) ⊂ Aˆ v,˜ v. Finally, because b(k) has a unique
ﬁxed point, An
b(ˆ v),b(˜ v) converges to Ak∗,k∗ = {dk∗} so that BRn(A−∞,∞) also converges
to {dk∗}.
4.2 Uniqueness Result with Proper Priors
In this section, we provide a characterization of equilibria in the limiting perturbed game with
general proper priors. In particular, we prove that in the perturbed game as σ → 0, the set of
period 1 equilibrium strategies converges to a unique strategy. We use the method of Laplacian
beliefs introduced by Frankel et al. (2003) and reviewed by Morris and Shin (2003) to prove our
uniqueness result. In fact we show that the game described above is equivalent to a game discussed
by Morris and Shin (2003). We then use their result to prove the following theorem. The proof is
in the Appendix.
Proposition 10 Given the value function V2(µ2) given by (18), as σ → 0 the set of ﬁrst period






1 if v1 ≥ v∗
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µ1¯ πl + (1 − µ1)π
ˆ µsd(l) =
µ1(1 − ¯ π)l
µ1(1 − ¯ π)l + (1 − µ1)(1 − π)
ˆ µh(l) =
µ1 [(1 − α)(1 − l) + α]
µ1 [(1 − α)(1 − l) + α] + (1 − µ1)α
5 The Multi-Period Model
In this section, we extend the model to many (possibly an inﬁnite number of) periods. The
qualitative properties of the model are very similar to the model with two periods. In particular,
we show that the game with noisy signal has a unique equilibrium in the limit as the observation
error converges to zero.
The extension of the model to multi periods is as follows: time is discrete and t = 1,    ,T. At
t = 0, the bank draws a quality type π ∈ {π, ¯ π} where Pr(π = ¯ π) = µ0 is given - µ0 is the initial
reputation level of the bank. In each period t the bank also draws a cost shock ct ∈ {c,¯ c} where ct
is i.i.d. over time and Pr(ct = c) = 1 − α. In each period, the bank originates a loan. When the
bank’s quality type is given by π, the loan yields a return of ¯ v with probability π and a return of
vt with probability 1 − π, where vt ≤ ¯ v. The return vt is an i.i.d. stochastic process that is drawn
from F(vt) in each period. The economy is also populated by a continuum of buyers who live for
one period. The information structure of the game is as in the two period model in section 4. In
each period before trading occurs, all agents in the economy observe vt = vt + σtεt where εt is
i.i.d. and distributed according to G(ε). They do not, however, observe vt. Given this information,
the agents trade in the market. After the trade, the default value of the return vt becomes public
information. Previous prices are not observed by current buyers. Based on observables, agents
update their beliefs at the end of period t.
Let VT(µT) denote the last period’s ex-ante value function VT(µT). Note that, the equilibrium
strategy in the last period is a cutoﬀ strategy with cutoﬀ v∗
T(µT) given by
v∗
T(µT) = ¯ v −
qr + ¯ c
(1 − µT)(¯ π − π)
35and hence,









{ˆ p(µT;vt) − q}dF(vt)
From Proposition 10 , as σT−1 converges to zero, the set of equilibrium strategies in period T − 1
converges to a cutoﬀ strategy with cutoﬀ v∗
T−1(µT−1) given by
v∗
T−1(µT−1) = ¯ v −
qr + ¯ c + β
  1
0 [¯ πVT(ˆ µsg(l;µT−1)) + (1 − ¯ π)VT(ˆ µsg(l;µT−1)) − VT(ˆ µh(l;µT−1))]dl
(1 − µT−1)(¯ π − π)
Notice that for σT−1 small and given the above cutoﬀ strategy, the value function at period
T − 1, VT−1(µT−1;σT−1) is given by




































   


























    
dG(εT−1)dF(vt)
and hence, the above formula becomes the following as σT−1 → 0:



















{¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)vt − q(1 + r) − c + βVT(ˆ µh(1))}dF(vt)
The value functions in each period can be constructed in a similar maneer. If the value function
in period t, Vt is increasing the same proof as in Proposition 10 applies. Therefore, we can state
the following theorem:
Proposition 11 If Vt+1(µt+1) is increasing in µt+1, for each µt, there is a unique equilibrium






1 vt ≥ v∗
t(µt)
0 vt < v∗
t(µt)
where v∗





[¯ πVt+1(ˆ µsg(l)) + (1 − ¯ π)Vt+1(ˆ µsb(l)) − Vt+1(ˆ µh(l))]dl = ¯ π¯ v+(1−¯ π)v∗
t −q(1+r)−¯ c
and Vt+1( ) is deﬁned recursively as in (23).
It is straightforward to show that the part of the value function associated with the type (¯ π,¯ c)
is increasing by proving that both the value of selling and holding is increasing in µt and therefore
that part is increasing. However, whether the part associated with the type (¯ π,c) is increasing
requires further assumptions on the set of parameter values - one assumption is that α is relatively
small. For all of our numerical examples, Vt(µt) is an increasing function.
376 Fragility
We think of equilibrium outcomes as fragile in two ways. One notion of fragility is simply that the
economy has multiple equilibria so that sunspot-like ﬂuctuations can induce changes in outcomes.
A second notion of fragility is that small changes in fundamentals induce large changes in aggregate
outcomes.
Equilibrium outcomes in our unperturbed game are clearly fragile under the ﬁrst notion because
that game has multiple equilibria. They are also fragile under the second notion if agents in the
model coordinate on diﬀerent equilibria depending on the realization of the fundamentals and if a
large mass of agents have reputation levels in the multiplicity region.
Since our perturbed game has a unique equilibrium, it is not fragile under the ﬁrst notion.
We argue that it is fragile under our second notion. In our multi-period model, the history of
past outcomes induces dispersion in the reputation levels of diﬀerent banks. In order for our
equilibrium to display fragility under the second notion, we must have that either banks with a
wide variety of reputation levels change their actions in the same way in response to aggregate
shocks or that the reputation levels of banks cluster close to each other. We conducted a wide
variety of numerical exercises and found that the clustering eﬀect is very strong in our model. This
clustering eﬀect clearly depends on the details of the history of exogenous shocks. To abstract from
these details, we consider the invariant distribution associated with our model and show that this
invariant distribution displays clustering. The invariant distribution is that associated with the
inﬁnite horizon limit of our multi-period model. We allow for a small probability of replacement in
order to ensure that the invariant distribution is not concentrated at a single point.
Figure 3 displays the cutoﬀ values for each reputation type for the ergodic set associated with
the invariant distribution.1 This ergodic set contains reputation levels between roughly 0.25 and
0.85. For collateral values above the cutoﬀs shown in Figure 3, banks sell their loans and below the
cutoﬀs banks hold their loans. This ﬁgure illustrates that as the collateral value falls, the adverse
selection problem worsens in the sense that banks with a wider range of reputations hold their
loans. For example, at a collateral value of 5, banks with reputation levels below roughly 0.4 hold
1The parameters used in this simulation are the following: ¯ π = 0.8,π = 0.3, ¯ v = 7,¯ c = 0.5,c = −3,α = 0.15,q =
.1,r = 0.5,β(1 − λ) = .99,λ = .4,µ0 = .6 where λ represents the exogenous probability of replacement and µ0 is
reputation of a newly replaced bank. The distribution of v is N(0,2).
38their loans and the banks with higher reputation levels sell their loans. At a collateral value of 4,
banks with reputation levels below roughly 0.65 hold their loans and banks with higher reputation
levels sell their loans. Thus, a fall in collateral values from 5 to 4 induces banks with reputation
levels roughly between 0.4 and 0.65 to switch from selling to holding their loans.
Figure 4 displays the invariant distribution of reputation levels for high quality banks. This
ﬁgure shows that the invariant distribution displays signiﬁcant clustering. Roughly 70 per cent of
high quality banks have reputation levels between 0.8 and 0.85. Small ﬂuctuations in the default
value of loans around the cutoﬀ values for such banks can induce a large mass of banks to alter
their behavior.
Figure 5 plots the volume of trade, measured as the fraction of all banks that sell their loans.
A decrease in the default value from 1.3 to 1.1 induces a 50 per cent decrease in the volume of
trade. In this sense, Figure 5 suggests that equilibrium outcomes in our model are fragile under
the second notion.













Figure 3: Cutoﬀ thresholds for high quality banks.
Next we analyze the forces that induce clustering in our model. Recall from Lemma 1 that,
conditional on a high quality, high cost bank selling, Bayes rule implies that 1
µt is a martingale.
Since 1
µt is a convex function, Jensen’s inequality implies that the reputation of a bank, µt, is a













Figure 4: Invariant Distribution of reputations of high quality banks.









Figure 5: Volume of Trade as a function of shock to default value.
40submartingale so that µt tends to rise. Conditional on a high quality, high cost bank holding,
the analysis of our equilibrium implies that the reputation of such a bank also rises. These forces
imply that the reputation of a high quality bank displays an upward trend. This upward trend
is dampened by replacement. Since all high quality banks tend to have an upward trend in their
reputations, these reputations tend to cluster towards each other.
This reasoning suggests that fragility under the second notion does not depend on the particular
equilibrium that we have selected. In both the positive and the negative reputational equilibria,
the reputations of high quality banks rises over time and tend eventually to cluster together. This
clustering tends to make them react in the same way to ﬂuctuations in the default value of the
underlying loans. We conjecture that any continuous selection procedure will produce periods of
high volumes of new issuances followed by sudden collapses.
We have analyzed the eﬀect of other aggregate shocks in our model. In particular, we allowed
the comparative advantage cost, ¯ c, to be subject to aggregate shocks. In that version of the model,
we found that banks with a wide variety of reputations tend to have cutoﬀs that are very close to
each other. That model displays fragility under our second notion because small ﬂuctuations in
holding costs around a critical value induce large changes in actions by banks with a wide variety
of reputations. (Details are available upon request).
7 Policy Exercises
In this section, we use our model to evaluate the eﬀects of various policies intended to remedy
problems credit markets that have been proposed since the 2007 collapse of secondary loan markets
in the U.S. We focus on the eﬀects of policies in which the government would purchase asset backed
securities at prices above existing market value, such as the Public-Private Partnership plan as well
as on policies which decreased the costs of holding loans to maturity, including changes in the Fed
Funds target rate, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), and increased FDIC
insurance.
We ﬁrst consider policies in which the government attempts to purchase so-called toxic assets
at above-market values. Consider the following government policy in the limiting version of the
perturbed game as σ → 0. The government oﬀers to buy the asset at some price p in the ﬁrst
41period.
Suppose ﬁrst, that p ≤ ˆ p(µ1;v1). We claim that the unique equilibrium without government is
also the unique equilibrium with this government policy. To see this claim, note that the equilibrium
in the second period is the same with and without the government policy so that the reputational
gains are the same with and without government policy. Consider the ﬁrst period and a realization
of ﬁrst period return v1 < v∗
1. In the game without the government, the HH bank found it optimal
not to sell at a price ˆ p(µ1;v1). Since the reputational gains are the same with and without the
government policy, in the game with the government, it is also optimal for the HH not to sell at
this price. A similar argument implies that the equilibrium strategy of the HH bank is unchanged
for v1 > v∗
1. Thus, this government policy has no eﬀect on the equilibrium strategy of the HH bank.
Of course, under this policy, the government ends up buying the asset from low quality banks. The
only eﬀect of this policy is to make transfers to low quality banks.
Suppose next that the price set by the government, p, is suﬃciently larger than ˆ p(µ1;v1).Then,
the HH bank will ﬁnd it optimal to sell and will enjoy the reputational gain associated with a
policy of selling. In this sense, if the government oﬀers a suﬃciently high price, it can ensure that
reputational incentives work to overcome adverse selection problems. Note however that this policy
necessarily implies that the government must earn negative proﬁts.
Consider now a policy which reduces interest rates in period 1 and leaves period 2 interest rates
unchanged. We begin the analysis with the unperturbed game. Such a policy increases the static
payoﬀ in period 1 from holding loans which worsens the static incentives for the HH bank to sell its
loan. Speciﬁcally, this policy raises both the threshold µ below which banks ﬁnd it optimal to hold
in the positive reputational equilibrium and the threshold ¯ µ below which banks ﬁnd it optimal to
hold their loans in the negative reputational equilibrium. Thus, this policy serves only to aggravate
the lemons problem in secondary loans markets.
Consider next a policy under which the government commits to reducing period 2 interest rates
but leaves period 1 interest rates unchanged. Obviously, this policy increases incentives for banks
to hold their loans in period 2 and thereby increases the threshold below which banks hold their
loans, µ∗
2. In this sense, it makes period 2 allocations less eﬃcient. We will show that this policy
reduces the region of multiplicity in period 1 and in this sense can improve period 1 allocations.
To show the reduction in the region of multiplicity, consider the reputational gain in the positive
42reputational equilibrium evaluated at µ:
β (¯ πV2(µs¯ v) + (1 − ¯ π)V2(µs0) − V2(µh))
Using 6, it is straightforward to see that an arbitrarily small reduction in interest rates of dr in
period 2 reduces V2(µs¯ v) by αqdr since µs¯ v > µ∗
2. Moreover, since µs0 and µh are strictly less than
µ∗
2, V2(µs0) and V2(µh) fall by qdr. As a result, the reputational gain falls by β¯ π(1 − α)qdr. This
decline in reputational gain induces an increase in the threshold µ. Similarly, we can show that
the policy induces a fall in the threshold ¯ µ. Thus, the region of multiplicity shrinks and in this
sense can improve period 1 allocations. Interestingly, such a policy is time inconsistent because the
government has a strong incentive in period 2 not to make period 2 allocations less eﬃcient.
An alternative policy which has not been proposed is to consider forced asset sales in which the
government randomly forces banks to sell their loan. Such a policy in our model would mitigate
the lemons problem in secondary loan markets by generating a pool of loans in secondary markets
consistent with the ex-ante mix of loan types. While this is a standard intervention directed at
increasing the price and volume of trade in markets that suﬀer from adverse selection, in our
model such an intervention comes at the cost of misallocating loans to those without comparative
advantage. Speciﬁcally, some banks with low costs of holding loans will be forced to sell to the
marketplace.
It is straightforward to show that a policy under which the government commits to purchase
assets in period 2 at prices which are contingent on the realization of the signals can eliminate the
multiplicity of equilibria and support the positive reputational equilibrium. While such a policy
would be desirable, the feasibility of such a policy can only be analyzed by developing a model in
which private agents cannot commit but the government can.
8 Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to make three contributions: a theoretical contribution to the literature
on reputation, a substantive contribution to the literature on the behavior of ﬁnancial markets
during crises, and a contribution to analyses of proposed and actual policies during the recent
43crisis. In terms of the theoretical contribution, we have combined insights from the literature that
emphasizes the positive aspects of reputational incentives (see Mailath and Samuelson (2001)) with
the literature that emphasizes the negative aspects of reputational incentives (see Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki
(2003)) to show that multiplicity of equilibria naturally arise in reputation models like ours. We
have also shown how techniques from the coordination games literature can be adapted to develop
a reﬁnement method that produces a unique equilibrium. In terms of the literature on the behavior
of ﬁnancial markets during crises, we have argued that sudden collapses in secondary loan market
activity are particularly likely when the collateral value of the underlying loan declines. In terms
of policy, we have argued that a wide variety of proposed policy responses would not have averted
either the sudden collapse or the associated ineﬃciency. An important avenue for future work is to
analyze policies which might in fact remedy the ineﬃciencies.
449 Appendix
Proposition 2. (Multiplicity of Equilibria) Suppose Assumption (1) is satisﬁed and 0 < µ∗
2 <
1. Then, there exist µ and ¯ µ with µ < µ∗
2 < ¯ µ such that if µ1 ∈ [µ, ¯ µ), the model has two equilibria:
in one the HH bank sells its loan, and in the other the HH bank holds its loan, if µ1 < µ, the model
has a unique equilibrium in which the HH bank holds its loan in period 1, if µ1 ≥ ¯ µ, the model has
a unique equilibrium in which the HH bank sells its loan in period 1.
Proof: We show that our economy has a positive reputational equilibrium. Using Lemma 1
and the result from Proposition 1 that V2 is nondecreasing, it follows that ∆g(µ1) ≥ 0. Next we
show that there is some critical value of µ1 denoted µg < µ∗
2 such that for all µ1 in the interval
µg < µ1 ≤ µ∗
1, ∆g(µ1) is strictly positive and increasing in µ1 and ∆g(µ1) = 0 for µ1 ≤ µg. To




µg¯ π + (1 − µg)π
.
That is µg denotes that initial reputation level such that if the HH bank sells and receives a good
signal, its reputation level would rise to µ∗
2.Since ¯ π > π, µg < µ∗
2. To see that for all µg < µ1 ≤ µ∗
1,
∆g(µ1) is strictly positive and increasing in µ1, rewrite the reputational gain as
∆g(µ1) = β (¯ π(V2(µs¯ v) − V2(µh)) + (1 − ¯ π)(V2(µs0) − V2(µh))).
Since µh = µ1 and µs0 < µ1, from Proposition 1 it follows that for all µg < µ1 ≤ µ∗
1,V2(µs0) =
V2(µh) Since µs¯ v > µh = µ1, it follows that ∆g(µ1)is positive and since µs¯ v is strictly increasing
in µ1 it follows that ∆g(µ1) is strictly increasing. To see that ∆g(µ1) = 0 for µ1 ≤ µg, note that
µs¯ v ≤ µ∗
2 so that V2(µs¯ v) = V2(µh).
Next, rewrite (10) as
(µ1¯ π + (1 − µ1)π) ¯ v − q + ∆g(µ1) ≥ ¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c (24)
Consider µ1 ≤ µ∗
2. Since ∆g(µ1) is a nondecreasing function of µ1 in this range and (µ1¯ π + (1 − µ1)π) ¯ v
is a strictly increasing function of µ1, it follows that the left side of (24) is strictly increasing in
45this range. Since ∆g(µ∗
1) is strictly positive, using (5) the left side of (24) is strictly greater than
the right side of this inequality at µ∗
1. Since ∆g(µg) = 0 and µg < µ∗
2, the left side is strictly less
than the right side at µg. Thus, there is a unique value of µ at which (24) holds as an equality. For
µ1 > µ∗
2, (µ1¯ π + (1 − µ1)π) ¯ v − q > ¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c and ∆g(µ1) ≥ 0 so that (24) is satisﬁed. We
have established that our model has an equilibrium in which all HH banks with reputation levels
above µ1 ≥ µ sell.




µb + (1 − µb)α
.
That is µb denotes that initial reputation level such that if the HH bank holds, its reputation level
would rise to µ∗
2. Clearly µb < µ∗
2.
Since µh = µ1/(µ1+(1−µ1)α) is greater than µ1, it follows that ∆b(µ1) is negative for µ1 > µb.
If µ1 ∈ [µb,µ∗
2], selling has a static cost, i.e. ˆ p(µ2) − q ≤ ¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c as well as a loss from
reputation, i.e. ∆b(µ1) < 0 so that the HH bank prefers to hold the asset. If µ1 ∈ (µ∗
2,1], there are
beneﬁts from selling the asset, i.e. ˆ p(µ2)−q ≥ ¯ π¯ v−q(1+r)−¯ c, while there is a loss from reputation
∆b(µ1) < 0. Assumption (1) ensures that when µ1 = 1, the static beneﬁt outweighs the loss from
reputation, i.e. (13) is reversed at µ1 = 1. Moreover, Since µh = µ1/(µ1 + (1 − µ1)α),it is easy to
show that (µ2¯ π + (1 − µ2)π) ¯ v−q+∆b(µ1) is a strictly convex function of µ1 for µ1 ∈ [µ∗
2,1]. Since
the value of this function is strictly less than ¯ π¯ v −q(1 +r)− ¯ c at µ1 = µ∗
2 and weakly higher when
µ1 = 1, there exists a unique ¯ µ ∈ (µ∗
2,1] , at which (13) holds with equality. For µ1 ≤ ¯ µ, (13) holds
and for µ1 > ¯ µ (13) is violated. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold. Then the unique equilibrium
of the static game described in Proposition 1 and the multiple equilibria of the dynamic game
described in Proposition 2 are also equilibria of the associated games when all bank types behave
strategically.
Proof: Consider the static game. It is suﬃcient to show that given the constructed equilibrium
and speciﬁed strategies for all agents, there is no proﬁtable deviation by any agent. Note that in
the proof of Proposition 2 we show that ∆g(µ1) ≥ 0 for all µ1 ∈ [0,1]. Hence, Assumption 2 implies
46that
µ1 (¯ π − π) ¯ v + qr < −c
or
[µ1¯ π + (1 − µ1)π]¯ v − q < π¯ v − q(1 + r) − c (25)
Inequality (25) implies that facing break even prices the low cost type bank would like to hold.
Moreover a deviation by a buyer must attract these types of bank and (25) implies that buyers
must oﬀer a price higher than the actuarially fair price. Hence, there is no deviation by any buyer
or a low cost bank type. Moreover, an LH bank wants to sell even at the lowest possible price, π¯ v,
since ¯ c > 0. Thus there are no proﬁtable deviation from the speciﬁed strategies in the static game.
Consider the positive equilibrium of the dynamic game. Given future beliefs, the value of selling
to a low quality bank adjusted by the future reputational gain from holding is given by
[µ1¯ π + (1 − µ1)π]¯ v − q + β [πV2(µ
g
s¯ v) + (1 − π)V2(µ
g
s0) − V2(µ)]
where µs¯ v = ¯ πµ1/(µ1¯ π + (1 − µ1)π) and µ
g
s0 = (1 − ¯ π)µ1/((1 − ¯ π)µ1 + (1 − π)(1 − µ1). The value
of selling to a high quality bank is given by
[µ1¯ π + (1 − µ1)π]¯ v − q + ∆g(µ1)
From assumption (14) and β [πV2(µ
g
s¯ v) + (1 − π)V2(µ
g
s0) − V2(µ)] = ∆g(µ1), we have
[µ1¯ π + (1 − µ1)π]¯ v − q + β [πV2(µ
g
s¯ v) + (1 − π)V2(µ
g
s0) − V2(µ)] ≤ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − c
[µ1¯ π + (1 − µ1)π]¯ v − q + ∆g(µ1) ≤ ¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − c
Hence, there is no proﬁtable deviation by the low cost types. As for the LH type bank, note
that in the positive equilibrium
[µ1¯ π + (1 − µ1)π]¯ v − q + β [¯ πV2(µ
g
s¯ v) + (1 − ¯ π)V2(µ
g
s0) − V2(µ)] ≥ ¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c (26)
We use the above inequality to show that the LH type bank does not have a proﬁtable deviation.
47There are two possible cases: Case 1. ¯ c+qr ≥ (¯ π−π)¯ v. In this case, µ∗
2 = 0 and V2(µ) is a constant
function. Therefore, ∆g(µ1) = 0 for all µ1 and β [πV2(µ
g
s¯ v) + (1 − π)V2(µ
g
s0) − V2(µ)] = 0. In this
case, we are back to the static game and as we have shown before, the LH bank ﬁnds it optimal to
sell always. Case 2. ¯ c + qr < (¯ π − π)¯ v < ¯ v. In this case, we have
β [V2(µs¯ v) − V2(µs0)] ≤ β(1 − α){[µs¯ v¯ π + (1 − µs¯ v)π]¯ v − q − ¯ π¯ v + q(1 + r) + ¯ c}
= β(1 − α){−(1 − µs¯ v)(¯ π − π)¯ v + qr + ¯ c}
The last expression is increasing in µ1 and therefore maximized at µ1 = 1. Hence, we must have
β [V2(µs¯ v) − V2(µs0)] ≤ β(1 − α)(qr + ¯ c) < ¯ v
Therefore,
−β(¯ π − π)[V2(µs¯ v) − V2(µs0)] > −¯ v(¯ π − π)
Adding this inequality to (26) , we get
[µ1¯ π + (1 − µ1)π]¯ v − q + β [πV2(µ
g
s¯ v) + (1 − π)V2(µ
g
s0) − V2(µ)] ≥ ¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c
which implies that the LH type bank does not have a proﬁtable deviation in the constructed
equilibrium.
As for the negative equilibrium, it is clear that a bank with low cost does not want to sell its
loan, since selling only punishes the bank. Therefore, it is suﬃcient to show that the LH bank
wants to sell its loan. That is, we need to show that for all µ1 ∈ [0, ¯ µ], we have
π¯ v − q + β[V2(0) − V2(µb
h)] ≥ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c (27)
where µb
h = µ1/(µ1 +(1−µ1)α). To do so, we ﬁrst show that this inequality is satisﬁed at µ1 = ¯ µ.
Now, since ∆b(µ1) = β[V2(0)−V2(µb
h)] is decreasing, this implies that (27) holds for all µ1 ∈ [0, ¯ µ].
By deﬁnition, ¯ µ satisﬁes
π¯ v − q + β[V2(0) − V2(µb
h)] = ¯ π¯ v − q(1 + r) − ¯ c
48Obviously, this equality leads to the above inequality. Therefore, we have shown that LH bank still
ﬁnds it optimal to sell in the negative equilibrium. Q.E.D.






) ≤ β(1 − α). Then, the utility level for each
type of bank and the buyers in the positive equilibrium is at least as large as the utility level for
the corresponding type of bank and the buyers in the negative equilibrium.
Proof: Here we show that if (1 − α)/(¯ πα − π) ≤ β(1 − α), then µn
h ≤ µ∗
2. The Proposition








≤ 1 + β¯ π(1 − α)
Let λ = 1
1+β¯ π(1−α). Then, λ(1 −
π
¯ π) ≤ α −
π
¯ π or λ + (1 − λ)
π
¯ π ≤ α. Now consider the following two
linear functions, f1(µ) = λ+(1−λ)(µ+(1−µ)
π
¯ π) and f2(µ) = µ+(1−µ)α. The value of the two
function coincide at µ = 1. Moreover, at µ = 0, by the above inequalities f1(0) ≤ f2(0). Hence, we
must have for all µ ∈ [0,1], f1(µ) ≤ f2(µ). In other words:
µ





µ + (1 − µ)α
Therefore, by Jensen’s inequality - E 1
X ≥ 1
EX, we must have that
λµ + (1 − λ)
µ









Note that by deﬁnition of µ, we must have
ˆ p(µ) + β(1 − α)¯ π
 
V2(µs¯ v) − V2(µ)
 
= ¯ π¯ v − qr − ¯ c
Further simpliﬁcation of the above implies that
1
1 + β¯ π(1 − α)
µ +
β¯ π(1 − α)
1 + β¯ π(1 − α)
µ





Then, by (28), we must have µ∗
2 ≥ µn
h. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 The reputation gain ∆(v1;ˆ a1) has the following properties:
491. ∆(v1;ˆ a1) is continuous in v1 and ˆ a1. Furthermore, if ˆ a1 is point-wise higher than ˆ a′
1, ∆(v1;ˆ a1) ≥
∆(v1;ˆ a′
1). Moreover, if ˆ a1(v1)  = ˆ a′
1(v1) for a positive measure subset of v1’s, ∆(v1;ˆ a1) >
∆(v1;ˆ a′
1). In particular ∆(v1;dk) is decreasing in k.
2. If ˆ a1 is switching strategy, ∆(v1;ˆ a1) is increasing in v1.
3. ∆(v1;ˆ a1) is bounded in the sense that there exists ∆ < ¯ ∆ such that for all v1 ∈ R and ˆ a1, we
have ∆ ≤ ∆(v1;ˆ a1) ≤ ¯ ∆.


























with equality only if A is measure zero. Given the Bayesian updating formulas, this inequality
implies that for any ¯ v1,
µsg(¯ v1;ˆ a1) ≥ µsg(¯ v1;ˆ a′
1),µsd(¯ v1;ˆ a1) ≥ µsd(¯ v1;ˆ a′
1),µh(¯ v1;ˆ a1) ≤ µh(¯ v1;ˆ a′
1)
with strict inequalities only if A is zero measure. Therefore, for each v1, the integrand in (20) is
higher for ˆ a1and therefore ∆(v1;ˆ a1) ≥ ∆(v1;ˆ a′
1) with equality only if A is measure zero.
2. If ˆ a1 is a switching strategy with switching point k,from (19) it is straightforward to see that
µsg(¯ v1;ˆ a1),µsd(¯ v1;ˆ a1) are strictly increasing and µh(¯ v1;ˆ a1) is strictly decreasing in ¯ v1. Thus the
integrand in (20)c is increasing in ¯ v1. Since we have assumed that H(ˆ v1|v1) is decreasing in v1,
from ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, it follows that ∆(v1;ˆ a1) is strictly increasing.
3. To show boundedness, we ﬁrst show that for all µ2, V2(µ2) is well deﬁned and continuous.
Since µ2 lies in a compact set, it follows that V2(µ2) is bounded. To show continuity, note that
when v2 ≥ (µ∗)
−1 (µ2), V2(µ2,v2) = ˆ p(µ2;v2) − q and if v2 < (µ∗)
−1 (µ2), V2(µ2,vd
2) = ¯ π¯ v + (1 −
50¯ π)vd
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µ∗−1(µ2)
{[ˆ p(µ2;v2) − q}dG
 







{¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)v2 − q(1 + r) − ¯ c}dG
 










{(1 − µ2)(¯ π − π)(¯ v − v2) − qr − ¯ c}dG
 




Using our assumption that the random variable v2 has a ﬁnite mean with respect to G in (29),
it follows that V2(µ2) is bounded. Continuity follows by inspection of (29) noting that so that G
and F are continuous functions. Thus, there exist bounds ∆ ≤ ¯ ∆ such that for any v1,ˆ a1
∆ ≤ ¯ πV2(µs¯ v(¯ v1;ˆ a1)) + (1 − ¯ π)V2(µs0(¯ v1;ˆ a1)) − V2(µh(¯ v1;ˆ a1)) ≤ ¯ ∆.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 The best response function b(k) satisﬁes the following:
1. b(k) is continuous and strictly increasing in k.
2. There exists a unique v∗
1, such that b(v∗
1) = v∗
1.
3. For all k > v∗
1, b(k) < k and for all k < v∗
1, b(k) > k.
Proof: 1.. b(k) satisﬁes the following
ˆ p(µ1;b(k)) − q + ∆(b(k);dk) = ¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)b(k) − q(1 + r) − ¯ c (30)
Since ∆(b;dk) is continuous in b and k, it is obvious that b(k) is continuous. An increase in k,
causes the function ∆(b;dk) to decrease by Lemma 2. Since ˆ p(µ1;b) − (1 − ¯ π)b is increasing in b,
from (30), b(k) must be an increasing function of k.
2. Any ﬁxed point of b(k), v∗
1 must satisfy
ˆ p(µ1;v∗
1) − q + ∆(v∗
1;dv∗
1) = ¯ π¯ v + (1 − π)v∗
1 − q(1 + r) − ¯ c
51Now, notice that under dv∗
1, from the Bayesian updating rules, the updating rules are functions of






. Therefore, we can rewrite ∆(v∗
1;dv∗














1 − ¯ v1
σ
   







1 − ¯ v1
σ








1 − ¯ v1
σ




1 − ¯ v1
σ
 


















[¯ πV2 (ˆ µsg (l)) + (1 − ¯ π)V2 (ˆ µsd (l)) − V2 (ˆ µh (l))]dl = ¯ π¯ v+(1−π)v∗
1−ˆ p(µ1;v∗
1)−q(1+r)−¯ c
The left side of the above equation does not depend on v∗
1 and the right side is strictly decreasing
in v∗
1. Since the right side ranges from plus inﬁnity to minus inﬁnity, there exists a unique v∗
1 that
satisﬁes the above equation. Now, notice that under dv∗
1, from the Bayesian updating rules, the























1 − ¯ v1
σ
   







1 − ¯ v1
σ








1 − ¯ v1
σ












[¯ πV2 (ˆ µsg (l)) + (1 − ¯ π)V2 (ˆ µsd (l)) − V2 (ˆ µh (l))]dl = ¯ π¯ v+(1−π)v∗
1−ˆ p(µ1;v∗
1)−q(1+r)−¯ c.
The left side of the above equation does not depend on v∗
1 and the right side is strictly decreasing
in v∗
1. Since the right side ranges from plus inﬁnity to minus inﬁnity, there exists a unique v∗
1 that
satisﬁes the above equation.
523. Suppose k < v∗
1 and b(k) ≤ k. Since limk→−∞ b(k) = ˆ v0 > −∞. Then by continuity of b( ),
there must exists k ∈ (−∞,k] such that b(ˆ k) = ˆ k. Contradicting part 2. Similarly, we can show
that for all k > v∗
1, b(k) < k. Q.E.D.
Proposition 10: Given the value function V2(µ2) given by (18), as σ → 0 the set of ﬁrst period






1 if v1 ≥ v∗
1













µ1¯ πl + (1 − µ1)π
ˆ µsd(l) =
µ1(1 − ¯ π)l
µ1(1 − ¯ π)l + (1 − µ1)(1 − π)
ˆ µh(l) =
µ1 [(1 − α)(1 − l) + α]
µ1 [(1 − α)(1 − l) + α] + (1 − µ1)α
Proof: We prove Proposition 10 by mapping our environment into that described in Morris and Shin
(2003) and show that their requirements for existence of a unique equilibrium in the limit are sat-
isﬁed.
Given a value function V2(µ2), consider an equilibrium strategy proﬁle in the ﬁrst period
(a1( ),ˆ a1( ),p1( )). In a game with full information about shocks to returns, when agents in period
2 believe that HH bank sells with probability l in the ﬁrst period 1, the HH bank’s diﬀerential gain
from selling is given by
ˆ π(v1,l) = ˆ p(µ1;v1) + qr + ¯ c − ¯ π¯ v − (1 − ¯ π)v1 + β [¯ πV2(ˆ µsg(l)) + (1 − ¯ π)V2(ˆ µsd(l)) − V2(ˆ µh(l))]
Then, in the game with private information, l =
 
ˆ a1(v1)dH(v1|¯ v1) is a random variable. We,
then, show that ˆ π satisﬁes the conditions A1-A3, A4*, A5, and A6 in Morris and Shin (2003).
53We then can apply Proposition 2.2 in Morris and Shin (2003) and that completes the proof of our
Propoisition. It is easy to see that ˆ µsg(l) and ˆ µsd(l) are increasing in l and ˆ µh(l) is decreasing in
l. Since, V2(µ2) is non-decreasing in µ2, ˆ π(v1,l) is non-decreasing in l - condition A1. Obviously
ˆ π(v1,l) is increasing in v1- condition A2. Since ˆ π(v1,l) is separable in v1 and l, and ˆ π(v1,l) is linearly




1,l)dl = 0 - condition A3. Since V2(µ2)
is a continuous function over a compact set [0,1], β [¯ πV2(ˆ µsg(l)) + (1 − ¯ π)V2(ˆ µsd(l)) − V2(ˆ µh(l))] is
a bounded above and below by ∆ and ¯ ∆, respectively. Now let
0 = −ˆ p(µ1;v1) − qr + ¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)v1 − ¯ c − ¯ ∆ − ε
0 = −ˆ p(µ1; ˆ v1) − qr + ¯ π¯ v + (1 − ¯ π)ˆ v1 − ¯ c − ∆ + ε
Then, if v1 ≤ v1, ˆ π(c1,l) ≤ −ε for all l ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, if v1 ≥ ˆ v1, ˆ π(v1,l) ≥ −ε for all l ∈ [0,1] -
condition A4*. Continuity of V2 implies that ˆ π(v1,l) is a continuous function of v1 and l. Therefore,
  1
0 g(l)ˆ π(v1,l)dl is a continuous function of g( ) and v1 - condition A5. Moreover, by deﬁnition of
F( ) and G( ), noisy signal v1 has a ﬁnite expectation, E[v1] ∈ R - condition A6. Therefore, we can





1,l)dl = 0. For any δ > 0, there exists a ¯ σ > 0 such that for all
σ ≤ ¯ σ, if strategy a1 survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, then a1(v1) = 1 for all
v1 ≥ v∗
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